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In the following contribution, I address the question whether and in 
what sense the ‘Axial Age’ led to a reformulation of the relation 
between politics and religion. The Axial Age theory was first for- 
mulated as early as the late eighteenth century by Anquetil DuPerron, 
a scholar of Zoroastrianism, who postulated that a “grande revolu- 
tion du genre humain” took place around 500 BCE, when in East 
and West great individuals arose such as Confucius and Laotse, 
Buddha, Zoroaster, the prophets in Israel and the early philosophers 
in Greece who founded new religions and philosophical systems.1 
However, the term ‘Axial Age’ was only taken up and elaborated 
again after a more than 150 year period of latency by three thinkers: 
the sociologist Alfred Weber, whose Kultursoziologie appeared in 1935, 
thc philosopher Karl Jaspers, whose Vom Ursprung und Jiel der Geschichte 
followed in 1949, and the political philosopher Eric Voegelin, whose 
monumental Order and Hislory in 1956 reformulated the theory. Of 
thcse three, Jaspers coined the term “Axial Age” and made the the- 
ory famous; but it was only Voegelin who gave a comparably clear 
description of the ‘pre-Axial’ world, the world which Israel and 
Greece left bchind. What in Weber’s and Jaspers’ reconstruction was 
nothing more than a pale counter-image of Europe, a mere ‘not- 
yet’, assumed a positive coloring in Voegelin’s description as a world 
of its own right, a positive alternative to monotheism and philoso- 
phy. Voegelin’s term for the pre-Axial world was “cosmological.”
Voegelin describes the decisive Axial transformation as a break- 
through (or ‘leap in being’) from the ‘cosmological myth,’ leading to 
‘history’ and monotheism in Israel, and to philosophy and meta- 
physics in Greece. He described this breakthrough as a process of 
conceptual transformation, from ‘compactness’ to ‘differentiation.’ 
Israel and Greece were able to recognize differences and draw distinc- 
tions where the oriental societies used ‘compact’ concepts blurring
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these differences in a systematic way. The Egyptian evidence confirms 
this viewpoint, especially with regard to the distinction between the 
political and the religious sphere.2 3I think that the specific Axial 
transformation, which the Bible represents as the children of IsraeV% 
exodus from Egypt and entering into a new religious and political 
order, in fact concerns the fundamental distinction between religion 
and politics. This must therefore be reconstructed and interpreted 
in terms of political theology. What Voegelin, however, failed to see, 
and what only Egyptology is able to bring to light, is that this ‘Axial’ 
breakthrough had forerunners or foreshadowings in Egyptian history. 
This finding must affect the chronological implications of the Axial 
Age concept, and these forerunners may be explained historically by 
breakdowns and disappointments in the political sphere—historical 
experiences of a rather traumatic character. Is there a relation between 
breakdown and breakthrough, trauma and innovation?
I Antecedents in Ancient Egypt 
1. The Judgment of the Dead
The first of these traumatic experiences concems the breakdown of 
the Old Kingdom (2800-2150 BGE), which gave rise of the idea of 
a general judgment of the dead? In the Old Kingdom, judgment after 
death was modeled on a terrestrial court: it was only in session if 
there was a litigant. A dead person had to be prepared for any pos- 
sible accusation, the more so as he/she had to reckon not only with 
human, but also with dead and divine accusers. However, if there 
was no accuser, there would neither be any trial. This form of post- 
mortem litigation was considered one of the many dangers belong- 
ing to the liminal state between ‘this world’ and the next. But it was 
not yet considered to be the necessary and inevitable threshold or 
passage between life and afterlife.
The idea that all who died had to pass an examination prior to 
entering the other world developed only after the fall of the Old 
Kingdom, at the beginning of the second millennium BC. This exam- 
ination took the form of a tribunal, to which all had to present
2 See Assmann (2000).
3 See Griffiths (1991).
‘AXIAL’ BREAKTHROUGHS AND SEMANTIC ‘RELOCATIONS’ 41
themselves after death. The significant difference between the old 
and the new concept, however, was that now the accuser was a god; 
but this god did not succeed whoever appeared, as per the Old 
Kingdom concept of judgment in the hereafter, as litigant and accuser; 
rather, he played the role formerly taken on by the king and the 
society. In the tombs of the Old Kingdom, biographical inscriptions 
began to appear during the latter half of the third millennium in 
which a tomb-owner addressed posterity and rendered account of 
his achievements. A common proverb conveyed that “the true mon- 
ument of a man is his virtue; the evil character will be forgotten.”4 5 6
The immortality of the tomb owner depended on the verdict of pos- 
terity, on the memory of future generations and their willingness to 
read the inscriptions and to recall the personality of the deceased. 
Their judgment was to decide upon his immortality. Regarding their 
immortality, or at least a prolongation of their existence beyond the 
threshold of death, the Egyptians believed in the possibility to estab- 
lish communication with posterity by means of a monumental tomb 
which would provide the possibility to future generations of visitors 
to read the inscriptions, regard the scenes and thus to become 
impressed enough by the virtue of the tomb-owner that would even 
recite a prayer for his soul.
The breakdown of the Old Kingdom in the last quarter of the 
third millennium, however, shattered this belief in the continuity of 
social memory and the durability of monuments. In this situation of 
anxiety and reorientation, the Egyptians ‘divinized’ posterity’s ver- 
dict in the form of a divine judgment at the court of Osiris. The 
idea of such a general judgment of the dead, where divine author- 
ity made the decision about immortality or annihilation, might be 
interpreted as a breakthrough into a kind of transcendence. ’ Compared 
to this-worldly institutions such as king, society and posterity, the 
divine tribunal doubtlessly had a transcendent, other-worldly char- 
acter. However, I prefer to speak not of ‘breakthroughs’ and ‘tran- 
scendcntal visions,’ but of ‘semantic relocations’ or ‘transfersV’ Here, 
ideas or semiologies are transferred from one sphere to the other— 
that is, from the socio-polidcal sphere of social memory to the divine
4 For details see Goedicke (1962: 26) and Schenkel (1964: 11 pp.).
5 See Assmann (1990: ch. V).
6 See also Assmann (2000). Johan Amason suggested the English term “reloca- 
tion” for the German concept of “Umbuchung.”
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sphere. In this case the semantic relocation resulted from severe dis- 
appointment in the political sphere. In the Old Kingdom, people 
had invested all their means into erecting a monumental tomb which 
they considered to be a safe fundament of immortality. By means 
of such a tomb, they hoped to continue their existence in the vicin- 
ity of their lord, the pharaoh, and in the memory of posterity. The 
breakdown of the Old Kingdom, with the disappearance of kingship 
and the pilloring and destruction of the tombs, showed these hopes 
to be illusory. Longing for safer warrants of immortality, people 
looked beyond the social sphere. Thus, the ‘breakdown’ of political 
order caused a ‘breakthrough’ towards meta-political foundations of 
order. The god Osiris and his court hlled the place vacated by the 
vanished pharaoh of the Old Kingdom, and he continued to stay 
in office even after pharaonic monocracy was reestablished in the 
Middle Kingdom. From then on, burial, tomb, and immortality were 
transferred from the political sphere of pharaonic competence to the 
divine sphere and laid into Osiris’s hands, who became the lord of 
death and the afterlife.
2. The Rise of Personal Piety
Our next example represents the most conspicuous case of such a 
relocation in Egyptian religious history. It concerns the rise and the 
final breakthrough of a religious trend, which Egyptologists call 
“Personal Piety.”7 An individual formed a special relationship with 
a certain deity, which in Egyptian is paraphrased in formulas such 
as “putting god N into one’s heart” and “walking (or acting) on the 
water of god N.” This new trend finds its first expression in prayers 
and tomb inscriptions of the fifteenth century where we read sen- 
tences like
God is father and mother for him who takes him into his heart,
He turns away from him who neglects his city, f. . .]
But he whom he leads will not loose his way.8
7 See Assmann (1996: 259 277, 2002). The term “Personliche Frommigkeit” has 
been coined by Erman in 1910 and translated as “Personal Piety” byjames Henry 
Breasted, who, in his magisterial and highly influential book The Developmmt of Religion 
and Thought in Ancient Egypt (1912), identified this concept as the hallmark of a whole 
period of Egyptian history (“The Age of Personal Piety”), referring to the Ramesside 
Age (1300 1100 BCE).
8 Assmann (1983: 228 pp„ 1975: No. 75).
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And in a prayer:
I gave you into my heart because of your strength. [. . .]
You are my protector. Behold: my fear has vanished.9
The language of these texts has a long history.10 11Many expressions 
can be traced back to thc First Intermediate Period (2150-2000 
BCE), where they describe the relation between patron and client. 
During the Middle Kingdom (2000-1750 BCE), the ruling dynasty 
adopted this relation, together with its rhetoric, for modeling of the 
new relationship between king and official. This was based on the 
latter’s interior core of motivation, virtue and responsibility: the heart. 
This attitude, called ‘loyalism,’ was then, after the breakdown of the 
Amama revolution, transferred to the divine sphere, and served to 
describe the relation between god and man. Typical of loyalism’s 
rhetoric is the opposition of wrath and mercy, the formulae of heart 
and water, and especially the stylistic device called ‘macarism’ or 
‘beatitude’ (“Happy the man who . . “blessed is the man who . ..”), 
known to all of us from the beginning of the book of psalms.
The rhetoric of loyalism had an important revival in the Amarna 
age around the middle of the fourteenth century BCE where we 
often read sentences like:
Blessed the man who puts you into his heart,
For he will spend his old age in perfection."
The Amarna period is known as an age of religious revolution in 
Egypt.12 Akhenaten closed the countless traditional cults and put the 
cult of the one single Aten in their place, the god of light and time. 
Akhenaten thought himself able to reduce the totality of reality to 
the workings of light and time; in his eyes, therefore, the other deities 
appeared as inert, superfluous, fictitious and false, contributing noth- 
ing to the explanation of rcality. Akhcnaten was the first in the his- 
tory of mankind to apply the distinction between true and false to 
religion, the same distinction which later, in the form of biblical 
monotheism, led to a transformation of ‘Axial’ dimensions. Akhenaten 
changed Egyptian cosmology in a most radical way, but he did not
9 Cairo CG 12217. See also Posener (1975: 206 pp.).
10 Cairo CG 12217. See also Posener (1975: 206 pp.).
11 Sandman (1938: 97.11-12).
12 Hornung (2000); Montserrat (2000); Reeves (2001).
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transcend it. His god was the sun, a cosmic energy, the source of 
light and time, without any personal and ethical traits. Above all, 
however, he did not touch the ‘compact’ unity or indistinction of 
religion and politics. On the contrary, he did everything to cement 
it and to counteract the beginnings of personal piety, which he seems 
to have felt as a rift in the politico-religious unity. Whereas Aton 
acted towards humanity as a cosmic energy, it was Akhenaten who 
presented himself as the personal god of the individual and the object 
of personal piety:
He shows his wrath against him who ignores his teachings
And his favor to him who knows it.13
Whereas personal piety tended to form an immediate relationship 
between a deity and an individual outside the official institutions of 
cult and temple, Akhenaten reinstalled the king as the sole media- 
tor between god and man. In this respect, the Amarna religion was 
more of a restoration than an innovation.
However, Akhenaten failed with his project, and this failure led 
to a complete resurgence of what he originally strove to suppress. 
After his death, the Egyptians not only returned to their traditional 
deities; the beginnings of personal piety now developed into the dom- 
inant mentality and religious attitude of the time. For this reason, 
Breasted, as early as 1912, labeled this historical period “the age of 
Personal Piety.”14 This new form of personal piety is best described 
as a semantic relocation by which the concepts and rhetoric of loy- 
alism were transferred from the political to the divine sphere, where 
they served to model the relationship between god and man. God 
succeeds the role played by Akhenaten in the Amarna period and 
formerly by the king in the Middle Kingdom and by the patron in 
the First Intermediate Period, acting as ‘father’ and ‘mother to all’: 
‘father of orphans,’ ‘husband of widows,’ ‘refuge for the persecuted,’ 
‘protector of the poor,’ ‘good shepherd,’ ‘judge,’ ‘pilot’ and ‘rudder,’ 
merciful towards his followers, terrible for his enemies. ‘Relocation’ 
means that something is withdrawn from one sphere and transferred 
to another. Thus, protection was no longer sought on the ‘mundane’ 
plane, from king or patrons, but on the divine plane, from a deity. 
In prayers we often read sentences of this kind:
13 Sandman (1938: 86.15-16).
14 Breasted (1972: 344-370).
I have not sought for myself a protector among men,
God N is my defender.15
In the time of Ramses II, a man called Kiki, a follower of the god- 
dess Mut who donated all his property to her temple wrote in his 
tomb autobiography:
He bethought himself 
That he should find a patron:
And he found Mut at the head of the gods,
Fate and fortune in her hand,
Lifetime and breath of life are hers to command.
[. . .] I have not chosen a protector among men,
I have not sought myself a patron among the great.
[.. .] My heart is filled with my mistress.
I have no fear of anyone.
I spend the night in quiet sleep, 
because I have a protector.16
The triggering factor for this process of transaction seems obvious: 
it is the traumatic disappointment on the political level that the 
Amarna revolution must have meant to the majority of Egyptians, 
the spectacle of kingship turning sinful and criminal towards the gods 
in the most radical and terrible way. The breakdown of a politics 
stressing the religious monopoly of the state led to the loss of this 
monopoly and to the rise of personal forms of religiosity.
It is precisely in this line of historical trauma and semantic relo- 
cations that the rise of Biblical monotheism and covenant theology 
has to be interpreted. It means the transference of the political insti- 
tutions of alliance, treaty and vassaldom from the mundane sphere 
of politics to the transcendental sphere of religion. In this respect, 
covenant theology may be compared to personal piety in Egypt 
which, as we have seen, was a relocation of the semiology of loyal- 
ism from the political to the religious sphere. In Israel, we are deal- 
ing with the ‘semiological divinization’ or ‘theologization’ of Egyptian, 
Hittite, Babylonian and especially Assyrian foreign politics (vassal 
treaties). What is most obvious, however, in the case of Israel is the 
connection with historical trauma. Covenant theology, and with it 
pure monotheism, developed after the fall of Jerusalem during and
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15 See e.g. Assmann (1975: 5 pp., 42 pp., 62 pp., 102 pp., 177).
16 Qader-Mohammad (1960: 48 pp.); Wilson (1970) and Assmann (1975 Nr. 173).
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after the Babylonian exile, after the complete failure and breakdown 
of the kingdom and after the loss of state and temple—in short, after 
the most traumatic series of experiences that could possibly befall a 
society in those times. The ensuing innovation corresponded in impor- 
tance and consequence to the gravity of the historical traumatization, 
surpassing by far everything that ever occurred in Egyptian history.
Using the model of a political alliance as a new form of the rela- 
tionship between god and man meant the creation of a completely 
new form of religion, which proved able to withstand the pressures 
of political oppression. The biblical texts, especially in Deuteronomy, 
use the language of Assyrian loyalty oaths17 and vassal treaties.18 The 
political theology of Assyria was adopted by ways of ‘subversive inver- 
sion’ and transformed into the political theology of Israel.19 Whereas 
the former emphasizes the inseparable unity of the divine and the 
political, the latter accentuates the categorical separation of these 
two spheres.
It seems obvious to me that there is a connection between this 
distinction and separation between politics and religion. On the one 
hand we have the Ausdifferenzierung or separation of religion from the 
overall system of culture, politics, morality, and law, and, on the 
other, that much more general disdnction between true and false in 
religion, which I have called the ‘Mosaic distinction.” In this dis- 
tincdon I see the proper hallmark of monotheism.20 My thesis is that 
this, rather than the widespread idea of the unity of the divine, was 
the great innovation that transformed the ancient world in the way 
of an Axial breakthrough. The distinction between true and false 
was alien to ‘primary religion,’21 which was based on distinctions 
such as ‘pure’ and ‘impure,’ ‘sacred’ and ‘profane.’ Its introduction 
meant a revolutionary step, creating a new type of religion which, 
for the first time and quite unlike primary religion, set itself off; not 
only from other religions and its own religious tradition, but also 
from other spheres of culture such as politics, law and economy as 
a cultural sphere; not only as an autonomous sphere in its own right, 
but endowed with superior authority and normativity, forcing the 
other spheres under its spell.
17 Otto (1999); Steymans (1995).
18 Baltzer (1964).
19 Otto (2000: 59-76).
20 See Assmann (1997).
21 See Sundermcier (1987: 411 pp., 1999).
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Thus, the ‘Mosaic distinction’ between true and false meant, above 
all, the distinction between religion and politics or ‘state’ and ‘church.’ 
Akhenaten, it is true, had already drawn the same distinction with 
regard to the traditional religion of ancient Egypt, which he abol- 
ished as false. This step, however, did not lead to a separation 
between the political and the religious spheres. Kingship kept its 
position as a mediator between god and man even after the Amarna 
period, in the “age of Personal Piety”; only its monopoly was bro- 
ken. But the state in Egypt continued to act simultaneously as a kind 
of church, it being the sole institutionalization of religion. The sep- 
aration of politics and religion, “Herrschaft” and “//«/”,22 the mun- 
dane and the transcendental, was therefore the exclusive achievement 
of Israel. This achievement is connected in the biblical account with 
the name of Moses and with the legend of the exodus of the chil- 
dren of Israel out of Egypt.23
The political meaning of the Mosaic Distinction becomes evident 
in the Exodus tradition. In this context, Egypt appears not so much 
as the representative of ‘false religion,’ that is, paganism and idola- 
try, but above all as the representative of ‘false politics,’ the ‘house 
of serfdom.’ The exodus from Egypt means leaving the house of 
oppression and entering the realm of freedom. ‘Freedom,’ to be sure, 
is not a biblical word and does not occur in this context, but the 
alliance or ‘covenant’ with God as formed at Mount Sinai is obvi- 
ously presented as liberation from serfdom under human rulership. 
Entering the alliance and the Law did not initially mean to found 
a state, but to get rid of the oriental principle of statehood and to 
found a kind of counter-society, in which the principle of statehood 
or kingship is allowed only minimal place.24 It is this anti-govern- 
mental impulse which is presented as a resistance against pharaonic 
oppression. Egypt appears as the paradigmatic ‘state,’ representing 
botli political and divine power and order. By lcaving Egypt, Israel 
separates itself from a political system denounced as false, oppressive,
22 See Assmann (2000).
23 As has been shown by Rodney Needham and Louis Dumont, a similar dis- 
tinction underlies the Indian system of “Dual Sovereignty,” that is, of religious 
(Brahmin) and political (Kshatriya) leadership. The duality of religious and military 
leadership seems, in fact, rather widespread even among tribal societies and has lit- 
tle to do with what I describe as the political implications and consequences of the 
“Mosaic Distinction.”
24 Sec Malamat (1990: 65-77); Handel (1981); Ix)hfink (1987); Clastres (1974).
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and humiliating. Seen from the view-point of the biblical texts and 
narratively enacted as an exodus from Egypt, monotheism appears 
as a political movement of liberation from pharaonic oppression and 
as the foundation of an alternative way of life, where humans are 
not ruled by a state, but freely consent to enter an alliance with 
God and adopt the stipulations of divine law.2:) Just as the people 
are liberated from political oppression, God emancipates Himself 
from political representation. Religious salvation now becomes the 
exclusive competence of God, who now for the first time takes the 
initiative of historical action and withdraws once and for all the prin- 
ciple of salvation (“Heil”) from political representation and ‘mun- 
dane’ power. The new form of religion meant hrst and foremost a 
new way of life, based on the divine laws of justice and purity rather 
than a new belief system.
The story takes place^ in Egypt and at a time strangely close to 
Akhenaten and his monotheistic revolution, in the fourteenth or thir- 
teenth centuries BCE, but it was told at a much later time, in the 
seventh through hfth centuries, in Judah and Babylonia during the 
time of Babylonian exile and Persian supremacy. In historical real- 
ity, therefore, the separation of state and church was achieved only 
in the sixth and hfth centuries, when the political functions of the 
‘state’ were taken care of by the Babylonian and Persian Empires, 
when Israel founded its identity as the people of God, a kingdom 
of priests based on Torah and Temple rather than on king and palace. 
From then on, politics and religion, or ‘state’ and ‘church,’ were 
different spheres whose relationship had to be laboriously negotiated 
and whose re-unihcation could only be achieved by force. Political 
theology turns into a critical discourse, which in biblical tradition is 
critical of govemment and, in Greek tradition, critical of religion. 
The distinction between and the separation of religion and politics 
or state and church has to be regarded as one of the most important 
features of axiality. This also means that the subsequent attempts at 
reuniting and streamlining25 26 7 these two spheres, as in the French tra- 
dition of the ‘rois thaumalurges, ’ in totalitarian forms of civil religion28
25 See Assmann (2000: 46-52).
26 I do not mean this, of course, in the historical sense of “what really hap- 
pened”, but in the narratological sense of narrated time. The biblical narrative is 
located in Egypt somewhere in the 15th through 13th centuries.
27 A helpless attempt at translating the Nazi-German term “Gleichschaltung.”
28 See Voegelin (1993).
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and also in religious movements insisting on the direct political rea- 
lization of religious truth, may be regarded as shifts towards de- 
axialization.
The anti-Egyptian or, more generally, the anti-state character of 
biblical monotheism and its political theology finds clearest expres- 
sion in the prohibition of images. Idolatry means, in the first place, 
legitimizing the state in terms of divine representation. The state pre- 
sents itself, in its images, symbols and ceremonies, as representative 
of the Divine; in biblical view, this is idolatry. From the view-point 
of Egypt, however, this is precisely what the state was made for.29 30
The Egyptians believed the gods were remote and hidden, with- 
drawn from earth and invisible. In lieu of their real presence, they 
installed the state on earth to represent them in the form of kings, 
images and sacred animals. The state’s most important task is to 
ensure divine presence under the condition of divine absence, and 
thereby to maintain a symbiotic relationship between man, society 
and cosmos. The king acts as representative of the creator:
Re has installed the king 
on the earth of the living 
for ever and ever,
administering jusdce to humans, satisfying the gods, 
creating true order and banishing disorder.
The king gives divine offerings to the gods 
and mortuary offerings to the transfigured dead.iH
The king depends on god whom he imitates and represents, and the 
god depends on the king for maintaining the order of creation on 
earth. God created the king, so to speak, ‘in his image,’ and in fact 
‘image of god’ is one of the most-used royal epithets.
Biblical political theology is the exact inverse. From this perspec- 
tive, it is precisely the category of representation which shows the 
falseness of pharaonic politics respectively religion in its most obvi- 
ous and abhorrent form: the sphere of kings, images and sacred ani- 
mals. The prohibition of images means, in the first place, that god 
must not be represented.31 Images contradict the real presence of 
the divine which is implied in the idea of the covenant. Covenant
29 See Assmann (1989: 55-88).
30 See Assmann (1995: 19 pp.).
31 See Dohmen (BBB 62, 2.ed. 1987); Metdnger (1995); Uehlinger (1998); Berlejung 
(1998); Dick (1999); Keel (2001).
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means a form of god’s turning towards the world which is both polit- 
ical and ‘living.’ The ‘living god’ (Elohim hayim) must not be repre- 
sented. Images are a means of ‘magically’ representing the absent 
divine. Images, therefore, imply or presuppose the idea of divine 
absence. The ‘living’ god hides and reveals himself as he chooses 
and forbids any attempts at magical ‘presendfication.’ This is the 
political meaning of the prohibition of images. The Golden Calf was 
meant to replace Moses, the only form in which God allowed Himself 
to be represented. The Israelites who believed Moses to be dead 
wanted to replace the representative of God by His representation. 
The function of the Golden Calf was clearly political. It was to serve 
not as a cult image but as a political symbol of leadership in the 
same way Moses did in his leading the people out of Egypt. The 
destruction of the Golden Calf put an end to these attempts of polit- 
ical representation. Images are artificial gods, and the relationship 
with ‘other gods’ (elohim aherirri] is forbidden. An alliance is formed 
with one overlord only. The political meaning of monotheism in its 
early stage does not deny the existence of other gods. On the con- 
trary, without the existence of other gods the request to stay faith- 
ful to the lord would be pointless. These ‘other gods’ were not 
non-existent, as were the gods whose worship Akhenaten abolished, 
but they were forbidden.
With the radical destruction of representation, the divine or ‘tran- 
scendental’ sphere became independent of political institutions. It was 
thus able to survivc the Babylonian exiie and the loss of sovereign 
statehood under the Persians, when the former kingdom of Judah 
became integrated into the Persian empire as a province within the 
satrapy of Transeuphratene. Religion became an autonomous sphere, 
constituting and consolidating a vantage point from which all other 
spheres of culture, including the political sphere, could be trans- 
formed. Max Weber, in his ‘ffvischenbetrachtung,’ identified the ten- 
sion between religion and other cultural spheres such as economy, 
politics, aesthetics, the erotic and the intellectual sphere, as charac- 
teristic of “Erldsungsreligionen!' (religions of salvation or redemption).32 
Tension presupposes distinction and differentiation, and the process 
of differentiation, especially concerning the religious and the politi- 
cal spheres, so I believe, lies at the core of axiality.
32 VVebcr (1920: 536-573).
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Voegelin reconstructed the process leading from the “cosmologi- 
cal societies” of the Ancient Near East to the rise of new, meta-cos- 
mic or “transcendental” world-views in Israel and Greece as a shift 
from “compactness” to differentiation. Compactness is the hallmark 
of myth and the totalizing tendency of mythical thinking.33 Differen- 
tiation, on the other hand, may be identified as a hallmark of axi- 
ality. Axiality, however, is not to be equated neither with antiquity 
(a certain time-period around 500 BCE) nor with modernity per se.34 
Weber and all those following his lead, including Voegelin and 
Habermas, regarded differentiation as a purely mental process and 
a form of rationalization. What I wanted to show in my contribu- 
tion, with regard to Ancient Egypt, is the close relationship between 
historical and intellectual processes. Distinctions and differentiations 
in the intellectual sphere were brought about and forced upon the 
human mind by catastrophic and traumatizing experiences on the 
plane of history. Certainly, the rise of monotheism in the Ancient 
World had historical consequences.35 But the rise of monotheism may 
itself be seen as a consequence of historical changes. In this sense, 
I take the rise of intellectual and religious concepts in Ancient Egypt, 
such as the ‘judgment of the dead’ and ‘personal piety’ to be con- 
sequences of, or at least in some way or other related to, historical 
trauma such as the breakdown of the Old Kingdom and the Amarna 
experience.
References
Assmann, Jan (1975). Agyptische Hymnen und Gebete. Zurich: Artemis.
—. (1979). “Weisheit, Loyalismus und Frommigkeit." In: Hornung, von Erik and 
Othmar Keel (eds.). Studien zu alltagyptischen Lebenslehren (Orbis Biblicus et Orient. 28). 
Fribourg: Universitatsverlag.
33 See especially the works of Claude Levi-Strauss. An overview can be obtained 
from Godelier (1973) and Habermas (1981).
34 Weber, Habermas, and others have depicted the differentiation of autonomous 
spheres the most characteristic property of ‘modernity.’ I would like to thank Johan 
Arnason who drew my attention to the problem of reconciling my concept of “dis- 
tinction and differentiation” with Max Weber’s theory of the separation of cultural 
spheres which is closely related to Weber’s concepts of occidental rationalization 
and modernization. I think it is important to distinguish between “axiality” and 
“modernity,” especially if we take axiality as a non-evolutionary concept (the “axial 
paradigm”, not the “axial age”).
35 See Stark (2001).
52 JAN ASSMANN
—. (1983). Sonnenhymnen in Thebanischen Grdbern. Mainz: von Zabern.
—. (1989). “State and Religion in the New Kingdom.” In: Simpson, William K. 
(ed.). Religion and Philosophy in Ancient Egypt, Yale Egyptological Studies 2. New Haven: 
Yale University Press.
—. (1990) Ma’at. Gerechtigkeit und Unsterblichkeit im Alten Agypten. Munich: Beck.
—. (1995). Egyptian Solar Religion in the New Kingdom. Re, Amun, and the Crisis of 
Polytheim. London: Kegan Paul International.
----- . (1996). Agypten: eine Sinngeschichte. Munich: Hanser.
—. (1997). Moses the Egyptian. The Memory of Egypt in Westem Monolheism. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.
—. (2000). Herrschaft und Heil. Politische Theologie in Altagypten, Israel und Europa. 
Munich: Hanser.
—. (2002). The Mind of Egypt. History and Meaning in the Time of the Pharaohs. New 
York, NY: Metropolitan Books.
Baltzer, Klaus (1964). Das Bundesformular. Neukirchen: Neukirchener Verlag. 
Berlejung, Angelika (1998). Die Theologie der Bilder: Herstellung und Einweihung von Bildem 
in Mesopotamien und die alttestamentliche Bilderpolemik OBO 162 Freiburg, Schweiz: 
Universitatsverlag.
Breasted, James Henry (1972). The Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt.
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Clastres, Pierre (1974). La societe contre I’Etat. Recherches d’ anthropologie politique. Paris: 
Editions de Munit.
Dick, Michael B. (1999). “Prophetic Parodies of Making the Cult Image.” In: Dick, 
Michael B. (ed.). The Making of the Cult Image in the Ancient Near Easl. Winona Lake, 
ID: Eisenbrauns. 154.
Dohmen, Christoph (1987). Das Bilderverbot. Frankfurt: Athenaum.
Griffiths, John Gwyn (1991). The Divine Verdict. A Study of Divine fudgement in the Ancient 
Religions. Leiden: Brill.
Godelier, Claude Maurice (1973). “Mythos und Geschichte. Uberlegungen iiber die 
Grundlagen des wilden Denkens.” In: Eder, Klaus (ed.). Seminar: Die Enlstehung 
von Klassengesellschaften. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 309-329.
Goedicke, Hans (1962). “A Neglected Wisdom Text.” In: Journal of Egyptian Archeology 
48: 25-35.
Habermas, Jiirgen (1981). Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns I. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp.
Handel, I. Michael (1981). Weak States in the Intemational System. London: Cass. 
Hornung, Erik (2000). Akhenaten. The Religion of Light. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press.
Keel, Othmar (2001). “Warum im Jerusalemer Tempel kein anthropomorphes 
Kultbild gestanden haben diirfte.” In: Pictor, Homo. Colloquium Rauricum 7. Leipzig: 
Saur. 244-281.
Lohfink, Norbert (1987). “Der Begriff des Gottesreiches vom Alten Testament her 
gesehen." In: Schreiner, Josef (ed.). Unterwegs zur Kirche. Alttestamentliche Konzeptionen, 
OD 110. Freiburg: Herder. 33-86.
Malamat, Avraham (1990). “The Kingdom of Judah between Egypt and Babylon. 
A Small State within a Great Powcr Confrontation.” In: Sludia Theologica 44. 
65-77.
Mettinger, Tryggve N.D. (1995). No Graven Image? Israelite Aniconism in Its Near Eastem 
Context. Coniectanea Biblica, OT Series 42. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 
International.
Metzler, Dieter (1991). “A.H. Anquetil-Duperron (1731-1805) und das Konzept der 
Achsenzeit." In: Achaemenid Hislory VII. Leiden: Brill. 123-133.
Montserrat, Dominic (2000). Akhenaten. Hislory, Fantasy and ancient Egypt. London: 
Routledge.
‘AXIAL’ BREAKTHROUGHS AND SEMANTIG ‘RELOCATIONS’ 53
Otto, Eckart (2000). “Political Theology in Judah and Assyria. The Beginning of 
the Hebrew Bible as Literature.” In: Svensk Exegetisk Arsbok 65 (Festschrift Tryggve 
N.D. Mettinger). 59-76.
—. (1999). Das Deuteronimium. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Posener, Georges (1975). “La piete personelle avant l’age amarnien.” In: Revue 
d’Egyptologie 27. 195-210.
Qader-Mohammad, Abd el (1966). “The Two Tombs Kyhy and Bak-en-Amin.” In:
Annales du Service des Antiquites Egyptiennes 59. 157-184.
Reeves, Nicholas (2001). Akhenaten. Egypt’s False Prophet. London: Thames & Hudson. 
Sandman, Maj (1938). Texts fiam the Time of Akhermtm. Briissel: Fondation Egyptologique 
Reine Elisabeth.
Schenkel, Wolfgang (1964). “Eine neue Weisheitslehre." In: Joumal of Egyptian Archaeo- 
logy 50. 6-12.
Stark, Rodney (2001). One Tme God. Historical Consequences of Monotheism. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Steymans, Hans Ulrich (1995). Deuteronimium 28 und die ade zur Theronfolgeregelung 
Assahaddons. Segen und Fluch im Alten Orient und in Israel. OBO 145, Freiburg, Schweiz: 
Universitatsverlag.
Sundermeier, Theo (1987) “Religion, Religionen.” In: Miiller, Karl and Theo 
Sundermeier (eds.). Lexikon missionstheologischer Gmndbegriffe. Berlin: Reimer.
—. (1999). Was ist Religion? Religionswissenschaft im theologischen Kontext. Giitersloh: 
Kaiser.
Uehlinger, Christoph (1998). “Du culte des images a son interdit." In: Le monde de 
la bible 110: 52-63.
Voegelin, Eric (1993) Die politischen Religionen. Vienna: Fink.
Weber, Max (1920). Gesammelte Aufsdtze zur Religionssoziologie I. Tiibingen: Mohr. 
Wilson, John Alabert (1970). “The Theban Tomb.” In\ Joumal of Near Eastem Studies 
29: 187-216.
